



The Statue of Liberty Plan:

A Progressive Vision
for Migration in the Age
of Climate Change

By Deepak Bhargava and Rich Stolz
August 2022

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Deepak Bhargava is a Distinguished Lecturer at CUNY's School of Labor and Urban Studies, a Senior Fellow at the Roosevelt Institute, Co-Founder of Leadership for Democracy and Social Justice, and Chair of the Board of 350.org. Previously, he led Community Change, which supports grassroots organizing in low-income communities of color in the US, for 16 years. He has been an organizer and campaigner for over 30 years, and has focused on issues of poverty, racial justice, and immigrant rights. He has played a leadership role in the immigrant rights movement since 2000, led national campaigns, and trained hundreds of grassroots leaders in the movement. He is co-editor, with Ruth Milkman and Penny Lewis, of *Immigration Matters: Movements, Visions, and Strategies for a Progressive Future* (New Press, 2021).

Rich Stolz is a Roosevelt Institute Fellow. He previously served as the Executive Director of OneAmerica, a statewide immigrant organizing, advocacy, and civic engagement organization in Washington State, where he built multi-sector coalitions and strategies on immigration, economic justice, and climate justice policies. Prior to OneAmerica, he served in multiple roles at Community Change, including as the Campaign Manager of Reform Immigration For America, the national campaign to pass progressive immigration reform during the Obama administration. Over the last several years, he has worked to bring immigrant rights and climate justice leaders together to design new intersectional organizing strategies, and he is currently advising several such efforts at the state and national level.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We are grateful to the 50 people who participated in two colloquiums held in February and March 2022, including 11 who wrote response papers. We appreciate feedback on a draft of this paper from our colleagues at the Roosevelt Institute, including Suzanne Kahn, Shahrzad Shams, and Kyle Strickland. Roosevelt staff Marissa Guananja and Sonya Gurwitt also contributed to this project. Deepak appreciates the conversations he had with colleagues at the CUNY School of Labor and Urban Studies and the *New Labor Forum*, and with the contributors to the book he co-edited with Penny Lewis and Ruth Milkman, *Immigration Matters: Movements, Visions, and Strategies for a Progressive Future*, which contributed greatly to his thinking on these issues. Both of us have been deeply involved in the work of the immigrant rights movement for decades—we're grateful most of all to the leaders who carry on the struggle with courage and imagination, whose work is an inspiration in dark times.



ABOUT THE ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE

The **Roosevelt Institute** is a think tank, a student network, and the nonprofit partner to the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum that, together, are learning from the past and working to redefine the future of the American economy. Focusing on corporate and public power, labor and wages, and the economics of race and gender inequality, the Roosevelt Institute unifies experts, invests in young leaders, and advances progressive policies that bring the legacy of Franklin and Eleanor into the 21st century.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Climate change and mass migration are reshaping politics, economies, and livelihoods around the world—and they are increasingly connected. Climate change has already forced people across the globe to leave their homes to seek safety and sustainable livelihoods, and the pace of climate migration will continue to accelerate as the climate warms. Sudden-onset disasters, like hurricanes and floods, and slow-onset changes, like desertification and rising temperatures, will make more and more of the world inhospitable or uninhabitable. Depending on the rate of climate change and population growth over the coming 50 years, between 1 and 3 billion people are projected to live in areas outside the climate conditions that have sustained human life over the past 6,000 years (Xu et al. 2020).

Yet national and international policy architectures are mostly silent about climate migration. There is no migration pathway in US law for people displaced by climate change, and international climate agreements have little to say about what is to become of the millions of people who will need to migrate to survive.

This report discusses the links between climate change and migration, and proposes a new plan—the Statue of Liberty Plan—for the US to reject nativism and instead embrace a new narrative and policies that would make the US the most welcoming country on earth for migrants and refugees.

This report discusses the links between climate change and migration, and proposes a new plan—the Statue of Liberty Plan—for the US to reject nativism and instead embrace a new narrative and policies that would make the US the most welcoming country on earth for migrants and refugees. Adoption of the plan would counter authoritarian appeals, advance national economic and cultural renewal, and strengthen and protect multiracial democracy.

In this report, we first summarize what we know about current and future climate migration. Even with needed mitigation and adaptation measures, increasing displacement caused by climate change will lead to greater levels of migration across borders—to the US, and around the world.

Next, we argue that the absence of a bold, progressive, pro-migrant policy vision and narrative has enabled a negative feedback loop between mass migration and authoritarianism.

Far-right parties are driving a “nativist consensus,” often supported by mainstream and even some left parties around the world. The nexus of nativism and authoritarianism threatens the entire progressive agenda. Progressive and mainstream leaders must challenge it with a robust, alternative that welcomes tens of millions of new immigrants over the next decade. That plan must work not only as good public policy but must also be grounded in a compelling narrative that animates a broad social movement.

We then propose a new narrative framework to build broad and sustainable public support for progressive immigration policies. Our proposal turns the focus toward *who we are* and who we want to be as a receiving nation. This shift centers the historical causes of migration, including the role of climate change (and the US contributions to it), and the importance of migration to the country's future. This is in contrast to dominant right-wing and liberal narratives around migration, which obscure the roles of colonialism and neocolonialism, extractive economic policies, carbon emissions, and US support for authoritarian regimes as drivers of migration. As with questions of race, the deliberate erasure of this history has produced a distorted common sense about immigration—the assumption that migration is a matter of individual decisions, with narratives of immigrants as threats versus contributors to our economy and society often competing with one another for dominance in public discourse. These stories differ in their judgment of the worth of immigrants, but elide the deeper truth that migrant activists have articulated for many generations: “We are here because you were there”—that is, that migration from countries in the Global South is the result of the actions of countries in the Global North. In this report, we therefore sketch an alternative narrative that emphasizes the historical roots and contemporary causes of migration.

It is strategic to emphasize the role of climate change as a driver of migration, both inside the United States and across borders, because we are feeling the effects of climate change now and because talking about our country's culpability for the climate crisis opens up a larger conversation about the historical and structural causes of migration. But beyond addressing the US's responsibility for righting past harms, we also argue for the importance of increased immigration to the country's future, as a cornerstone for a project of national economic and cultural renewal. A workable narrative about migration will speak not only about who migrants are, but about who *we* are: situating migration in the larger struggle—past, present, and future—to define our national character and identity and uphold multiracial democracy.

We also propose a new policy architecture for climate migration to make the US the most welcoming country on earth for immigrants and refugees. A massive increase in migration levels is both just and necessary to address the corrosive humanitarian impacts of restrictive policies, the role of the US in causing climate change, the impact of repressive immigration policies on US culture and policy, and the country's unsustainable demographic decline. The centerpiece of our proposal is to admit 75 million immigrants over a decade, thereby doubling the foreign-born share of the US population to over 30 percent. This would entail increasing annual admissions from roughly 1 million per year before the Trump administration to 7.5 million per year. New migrants would come to the US through

A massive increase in migration levels is both just and necessary to address the corrosive humanitarian impacts of restrictive policies, the role of the US in causing climate change, the impact of repressive immigration policies on US culture and policy, and the country's unsustainable demographic decline.

expanded family, humanitarian, and diversity pathways. We would admit immigrants through a system founded on progressive values, including family unity, racial justice, and worker rights. Migrants forced to move by climate change would come to the US through modified humanitarian pathways that explicitly recognize factors related to climate change. This approach contrasts with neoliberal approaches to immigration policies that rely on expansion of existing exploitative employment visa programs. We sketch a set of supporting policies related to immigrant integration, measures to enable more people to stay in their home countries, dismantling the border security state, and incorporation of immigrants into a climate resilience agenda.

Finally, we propose movement-building and coalition-building strategies to bring together a mass constituency for creating policies welcoming immigrants to the United States. We suggest two crucial steps. First, thousands more people need to be engaged in the practical work of welcoming immigrants and refugees to build a broad constituency for policy change and to establish a “welcome culture.” Second, sectors of society with emotional ties and interests in expanded immigration—including immigrant rights, environmental, racial justice, labor, faith, LGBTQ+, and business organizations—must be activated to provide the power required to achieve these ambitious policy goals.

METHODOLOGY

Climate migration is an emergent megatrend that is reshaping our culture, economy, and politics in profound ways. We hope that this report contributes to the ongoing discussion about future visions for migration policy and to more just outcomes for migrants, refugees, and all marginalized people.

One of us (Bhargava) authored a paper in *New Labor Forum*, “Social Democracy or Fortress Democracy: A Twenty-First Century Immigration Plan,” that took stock of the immigration debate in the US one year after Biden’s election (Bhargava 2021). The article was written against the backdrop of a nativist upsurge in the US, the political weaponization of anti-immigrant sentiment, the Biden administration’s missteps on refugee admissions and asylum policy, and visible brutality against Central American and Haitian asylum seekers at the southern border. Bhargava’s paper argued that nativism energizes rising authoritarianism movements in the US and throughout the West, and that centrist, liberal, and leftist forces have failed to articulate a coherent response.

The positive reaction to the *New Labor Forum* article prompted us to initiate an intensive research project that involved reviewing relevant literature on a wide range of topics, from the expected impacts of climate change on migration to the extent and nature of demographic change in the US to the ways in which countries around the world have responded to similar trends. We drew on the deep experience one of us has had (Stolz) in forging coalitions and policy agendas at the state level at the intersection of climate justice, racial justice, and immigrant rights. We talked to experts in various fields and organized two colloquiums consisting of 50 people from immigrant rights, environmental justice, labor, racial justice, and other movements, as well as leading academics, communications professionals, and policymakers. We invited 11 response papers from participants to reflect on Bhargava’s original article and to explore particular themes—such as the expansion of the border security state, the relationship of environmental justice and immigrant rights, and the role of the labor movement. This report considers the intersection of policy, movement building, and narrative strategies, because we believe any paradigm shift will only succeed if articulated across all three dimensions. While we benefited from deep engagement with the ideas of experts and practitioners we consulted, the views expressed here are our own.

THE DIMENSIONS OF CLIMATE MIGRATION

In community learning sessions that brought immigrants in Seattle and neighboring areas together, one immigrant leader in the Pacific Islander community reframed the discussion when he tearfully explained that the current struggle for immigrant rights was missing a critical perspective: The experiences of those who had nowhere to return to because of the impacts of sea level rise.

Frontline Latino and African immigrant community groups in the South Park community of Seattle have been organizing for years against air and water pollution in their community along the Duwamish river. A hazards map prepared by the City of Seattle during its comprehensive planning process a decade ago alerted the community to a new threat: Community members who had been forced to leave their home countries, in part due to climate change impacts, were confronted by the likelihood that in the next 10 to 20 years, their homes in the US might soon be unlivable due to sea level rise.

These stories are drawn from the organizing experience of one of us (Stolz) leading an immigrant organizing group in Washington state working on climate justice. Immigrants and refugees have known for years what international agencies have begun to report: Displacement and migration across the globe have risen dramatically in recent years. The UN High Commission on Refugees reported that as of May, 100 million people had been displaced by conflict, war, persecution, and human rights violations in 2022, setting an all-time record (UN High Commission on Refugees 2022).

Models that predict displacement and migration caused by climate change are imperfect but illustrate the scope of the humanitarian crisis ahead:

- Internal displacement—forced migration within a country’s borders—is growing worldwide. An analysis tallied “new” displacements in 2020: 9 million from conflict and 30.7 million from disasters (and 30 million of those from weather-related disasters) (International Displacement Monitoring Center 2021).
- The World Bank estimates that 216 million people will be forced to migrate due to slow-onset climate change impacts—water availability, sea level rise, crop production—by 2050. The models predict that nearly half that number will be forced to move in Africa alone. Models predict that 17 million people will be displaced in Latin America (Clement 2021), which is particularly relevant to US immigration policies.

- Drawing in part on World Bank modeling, another analysis estimates that the number of migrants pushed to migrate to the United States from Mexico and Central America alone will increase to 1.5 million annually by 2050, compared to an anticipated 750,000 in 2025. In the most extreme climate scenarios, more than 30 million migrants would head toward the US border over the course of the next 30 years (Lustgarten 2020a).

Wide swaths of our planet are at risk of becoming uninhabitable. Rising sea levels and saltwater contamination of freshwater are already placing pressure on coastal cities and communities around the world. Prolonged droughts are transforming currently habitable lands into deserts, starving people and eroding their livelihoods. Weather patterns are shifting, and communities are experiencing more intensive heat events leading to higher rates of heat-related illnesses and deaths. More intense rainy seasons are leading to excessive flooding at a frequency and severity not seen before. And accelerating major weather events—hurricanes, cyclones, etc.—are devastating communities. For example, during a heatwave this March, India had the highest temperatures it had seen in 122 years, and it was the hottest April on record in Pakistan (Patel 2022).

Some observers have already linked the rise of migration to climate change, but for the wrong reasons. Those on the right have used the connection to argue for greater militarization and border security, while some on the left have done so to underline the urgency of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by appealing to fears of mass migration (de Hass 2020). It is also true that we should approach estimates of climate migration with caution. Modeling future climate impacts on population shifts is inherently challenging because such efforts are dependent on a range of variables tied to choices made by governments and their citizens, not inexorable laws. The decision to leave one's home country is based on many complex factors and is hard to forecast. Climate change has a variety of second order effects including food insecurity, armed conflict, and increasing strain on public services. This can obscure the role of climate change as a driver of migration. Today, despite the growing impact of climate disruption, most migration worldwide can be attributed to other factors—such as economic need, war, and political turmoil. Because all of these are exacerbated by climate change, it is difficult to isolate the role of climate change specifically (de Sherbinin 2020). This has important policy implications that we discuss later in this report.

We are, however, incontestably in the initial stages of a new era defined by a changing global climate. Efforts to reduce carbon emissions are essential to stave off the worst climate impacts, but the consequences of a warming planet are not something to be addressed in a far-off future—we must adapt to them now. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has cataloged the devastating impact of climate change to date and reports that “[c]limate and weather extremes are increasingly driving displacement in all regions” (IPCC 2022). Mass displacement and international migration spurred by climate change impacts are happening now and demand a robust humanitarian response.

There is often an assumption in US discourse over immigration—particularly in threat narratives, but also in sentimental descriptions of immigration history—that all people want to migrate to the United States. In fact, most people would prefer to not move at all.

There is often an assumption in US discourse over immigration—particularly in threat narratives, but also in sentimental descriptions of immigration history—that all people want to migrate to the United States. In fact, most people would prefer to not move at all. People displaced by soaring temperatures and extreme weather events first migrate to neighboring regions in their own countries, usually urban centers. If conditions force them to move further, they eventually choose to leave their home countries altogether. Years may pass between the experience of displacement and the choice to migrate to a new country, whether that country is the US or another receiving nation.

In the United States, the southern border dominates contemporary discussions on migration. The majority of migrants (including asylum seekers) apprehended at the southern border come from Mexico and Central American countries (US Customs and Border Protection 2022). Over the

last several years, border encounters reported by Customs and Border Protection, a unit within the US Department of Homeland Security, have increased significantly.¹ While migration to the United States comes from all regions of the world, the proximity of Mexico and Central America (and the Caribbean, about which there is less data) is an important factor in anticipating potential future migration.

The increase in border encounters is attributable to a range of factors, including the climate impacts of drought, intensifying storms (e.g., hurricanes Eta and Iota) and flood events, and resulting food insecurity, compounded by safety concerns. In central America and the Caribbean, nearly a third of “migrants in the affected areas cited climate-induced lack of food as the main reason for leaving their homes and becoming migrants” (Masters 2019). Climate modeling predicts a warmer and drier climate, placing most of the region on track toward severe and moderate drought by the end of the century (Masters 2019). Growing drought and food insecurity—compounded by major hurricanes and floods in 2021—coupled with persistent concerns over governmental corruption and violence, explain in large part the significant increase in migration to the United States from this region of the world.

¹ In 2021, the number of Guatemalans, Hondurans, Salvadorans, and Nicaraguans apprehended at the southern border numbered 734,000, representing 44 percent of all encounters at the US-Mexico border. By contrast, 249,000 Central American apprehensions occurred in 2014 (US Customs and Border Protection 2022). This demonstrates a significant shift to increased migration from Central America coinciding with major events associated with social unrest, increasing violence, and climate change.

CLIMATE MIGRATION AND AUTHORITARIANISM: THE NATIVIST CONSENSUS & THE NEED FOR A PROGRESSIVE ALTERNATIVE

In the absence of a bold, progressive vision for future migration, a dangerous feedback loop between increased migration and authoritarian politics has taken hold. Across the globe, authoritarian governments have closed borders, erected walls and fences, and established large security forces to surveil, detain, and expel migrants. Far-right parties in Europe and the United States have invoked the specter of uncontrolled migration to win political support. Restrictive migration policies are a leading element in the programs of nearly all right-wing political parties. To stoke nativism and win votes, they have spread “great replacement theory”—the noxious and false idea of an elite plot to replace native-born, white populations with migrants of color. One-third of Americans now believe this preposterous conspiracy theory (Snow 2021).

When in power, authoritarian regimes often take actions that cause mass migrations—including, for example, the forced migration of Rohingya fleeing genocidal violence in Myanmar and of Ukrainians in the wake of the Russian invasion. Forced migration is increasingly used as a weapon to control, destabilize, and oppress populations; to take land; and to place pressure on the governments and resources of neighboring countries. Forced migration is not only a fundamental attack on human rights but a tool to exert power beyond national borders by fomenting chaos and turmoil.

Mainstream (center-right and center-left) parties and some left parties have, for the most part, been rattled by the right’s weaponization of mass migration and are often incoherent and contradictory in their response. Many have adopted the ideas of far-right parties, including greater restrictions on migration and vastly increased expenditures on border security (Broening 2018; Mishra 2021; Piser 2019). Numerous studies show that when mainstream parties adopt frameworks that mimic

In the absence of a bold, progressive vision for future migration, a dangerous feedback loop between increased migration and authoritarian politics has taken hold.

far-right policies, they inevitably legitimize and strengthen the standing of the far right (Krause, Cohen, and Abou-Chadi 2018; Abou-Chadi 2019; Bale 2018). Others have sought to downplay immigration and emphasize other issues in public dialogue. As with efforts to sidestep controversies on issues of racial justice, this is a losing strategy that allows nativist rhetoric and ideas to dominate the public conversation unchallenged (Haney López 2014; McGhee 2021).

Mainstream and some left parties have embraced massive increases in the scale and scope of the “border industrial complex” as a core response to mass migration. The massive growth of the US homeland security budget to harden the border—walls, sensor technologies, drones, and robotic surveillance—has both irrevocably changed life in border communities and lined the pockets of major corporations profiting from government investments in surveillance, data mining, and other war-oriented technologies. As Miller (2021) and others have pointed out, increases in these investments have far outpaced the US investments in climate finance, which would mitigate the impact of climate change in countries from which people are migrating.

This militarization of borders has had devastating consequences, leading to increasing death rates of migrants in deserts and at sea. The normalization of death has numbed the public to the consequences of harsh immigration policies, while images of militarized mass roundups of migrants have fed racist dehumanization and demagogic political appeals. Even when policies elicited public outrage—as with children in cages and Haitian migrants being chased by border patrol agents on horses using their reins as whips—mainstream parties have deplored the brutal tactics but failed to question the underlying policy framework. They fail to acknowledge how the border security complex has boosted the growth of cartels and smugglers who exploit migrants and destabilize border communities.²

The rise of a shadowy border security state has nurtured a web of corporate interests and a growing workforce who support far-right politicians and migration panics. A powerful, interlocking set of interests profit from the misery of migrants. As several experts point out in a paper submitted for colloquiums that contributed to this report:

[t]he border, surveillance and security industries . . . engage in the presentation of false “solutions” to climate change such as ramping up border control. In doing so, they create a false sense of security and provide alternative routes of action for states to take other than decarbonization. [This is] not only bad for migrants. The byproducts include climate inaction, geopolitical crises, routine repression of humanitarians, and extended mass surveillance. We need a clear explanation of who wins and who loses under a policy of private-public border expansion. (Miller, Akehurst, Akkerman, and Buxton 2022)

² For sophisticated but morally and strategically flawed versions of the liberal case for restrictionism, see Farer (2019), Krastev (2020), and Streek (2017). The authors write, respectively, from avowedly liberal, human rights, and socialist perspectives and come to embrace restrictionism through different logics.

One alarming path of the center-left and left is a kind of *herrenvolk* (“master-race”) populism—that is, generous social welfare benefits for native-born citizens and harsh treatment, few rights, and limited access to benefits for (or outright expulsion of) migrants, who are largely people of color. Indeed, these policies are openly advocated or tolerated by some mainstream and left parties in Europe. The penetration of this nativist consensus into governance is embodied in the “green-brown” alliance that brought a neo-fascist party into a governing coalition with the Green Party in Austria. Appeasement or embrace of right-wing immigration agendas, narratives, and partners is capitulation because it requires abandonment of core progressive values such as the dignity of all human beings, internationalism, anti-racism, and solidarity.

WHAT WE CAN LEARN FROM EXCEPTIONS TO THE NATIVIST CONSENSUS

While the nativist consensus has been ascendant in much of the world, there have been important exceptions. Perhaps the most renowned is Germany. In 2015, as the Syrian civil war displaced hundreds of thousands of Syrians, Chancellor Angela Merkel opened Germany’s doors to a million refugees. Merkel did not offer any grand historical or moral rationale for the decision, saying famously and laconically at the time that Germany was a strong country and “Wir schaffen das” (“We will make it” or “We can manage it.”)

Though controversial at the time, Merkel’s decision had an important subtext, grounded in reckoning with the country’s history: a sense of duty to uphold the principle of asylum, which was established as a “direct result of Germany’s persecution of Jews, Roma, LGBTQ+ people, and others during the Third Reich” (Crawford 2021). Her decision galvanized the nativist and fascist right wing in her country, but she did not act alone: Following Merkel’s decision to welcome Syrian refugees, millions of Germans volunteered to help (Rogers 2021; Crawford 2021). In the five years following her decision, Merkel’s approval ratings ranged from a low of 18 percent to a high of 80 percent, peaking as she stepped down from her post in 2020 (Oltermann 2020). The far-right Alliance for Deutschland, in comparison, saw its support decline to 10.3 percent of the vote in national 2021 elections, a far lower level than many other far-right parties in Europe (Schulthies 2021).

In recent months, in the wake of war and turmoil in Afghanistan and Ukraine, the US has taken important steps to welcome refugees from those countries. While imperfect—in part because of how hastily they were established—these initiatives exemplify what is possible in immigration policy when political will is present. Operation Allies Welcome, the initiative to support migrants fleeing the Taliban-controlled government in Afghanistan, includes initial processing at pre-designated US military bases prior to connecting Afghan nationals with non-governmental organizations for resettlement into communities in the United States. In half a year’s time, more than 76,000 Afghan nationals were welcomed to the United States. And thousands of American citizens have been engaged in the Afghan resettlement process, through traditional refugee

resettlement programs and other vehicles including Welcome.US, a new national initiative that seeks to inspire, mobilize, and empower Americans from all parts of the country to welcome people seeking refuge in the US. The organization has tapped a remarkable array of nontraditional groups, from Lions Clubs to Rotary Clubs, reaching across the political spectrum to create a broad social base for resettlement (Muñoz and Bridgeland 2022).

Similarly, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, President Biden announced the United for Ukraine initiative. Under the program, US citizens—often members of institutions such as churches—can sponsor Ukrainians to come to the United States. The response from ordinary Americans has been significant: As of May 2022, more than 45,000 Americans had applied to sponsor Ukrainian refugees in the United States. The Ukrainian refugees can remain in the United States for up to two years under the designation of humanitarian parole.

These cases illustrate principles that should inform strategies for expanded immigration:

- **Civil society must have a central role.** Creating direct opportunities for individuals to engage as volunteers and supporters is essential—both because of limitations on government capacity and because successful integration demands it. Including “unusual suspects” across the political spectrum will help build a broad civil society consensus for expanded migration.
- **A narrative that establishes a clear historical, emotional, or other connection between migrants and those who would welcome them helps build popular support.** In the German case, the connection was a sense of responsibility that derived from a decades-long reckoning with the country’s own history. Where a public consensus about responsibility has not been established—as has been the case for migration from the Northern Triangle and Haiti to the US—it has proved far more challenging to build robust political support for expanded migration.
- **Steadfast political leadership is essential to combat nativism.** Merkel’s leadership was pivotal, but there was support from many parts of the political spectrum. Much (though not all) of the German center-left and left directly challenged racism, tied nativism to frightening far-right movements to make them toxic, mobilized thousands of people on the streets, and proposed an inclusive vision of German identity and belonging.

A social democracy surrounded by moats, walls, and barbed wire is no democracy at all.

It is difficult to see how a larger progressive economic or social justice agenda can prevail if this nativist consensus goes unchallenged. The inherent racism of that nativist consensus inevitably affects the standing and rights of citizens of color, for example, through rising hate crimes (sometimes taking the form of mass shootings in which the shooter cites replacement theory as a motivation, as in El Paso, Buffalo, or Christchurch.) The

devaluation of the lives of immigrants of color is a malignant cancer that can spread through the bloodstream of society, undermining the foundations of multiracial democracy. A social democracy surrounded by moats, walls, and barbed wire is no democracy at all.

Climate has not yet been a major feature of far-right discourse on migration, in part because the far right denies climate change itself or sees it as a peripheral concern. However, we can expect that as climate change accelerates the movement of people across borders, racist panics about mass migration and demographic change will proliferate, making the security and great replacement frames even more culturally resonant. Seasonal waves of migration to the US provoke hysterical coverage in conservative media that shapes mainstream media narratives and forces politicians to respond by looking “tough.”

The need for an alternative vision is urgent. Demagoguery about immigration is already roiling US politics and fueling authoritarianism. This negative feedback loop will become an even more existential threat as climate change pushes more people to seek refuge in the US.

A progressive vision must uphold the dignity of all human life, affirm our responsibilities to each other in an increasingly interconnected world, and directly challenge rather than seek compromise with the cramped and racist vision of right-wing authoritarianism. It will tell the truth about why people come to the US and pose an alternative to the ahistorical and individualist approaches common on the right and center-left. An alternative approach must not only work as a set of policies but as a hopeful narrative of our future that can galvanize a broad constituency with sufficient power to achieve that vision. We need a compelling story about not only who migrants are and why they come but about who *we* are as a nation, with choices about how we respond. A vision for climate migration will necessarily break down the silos that have separated issues and constituencies working on climate, economic, and immigration policy.

A progressive vision must uphold the dignity of all human life, affirm our responsibilities to each other in an increasingly interconnected world, and directly challenge rather than seek compromise with the cramped and racist vision of right-wing authoritarianism.

“WE ARE HERE BECAUSE YOU WERE THERE”: A NEW NARRATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR CLIMATE MIGRATION

Climate change is not currently part of the public discourse about immigration. For example, media discussion about migrants seeking asylum at the southern US border early in Biden’s term was mostly silent about the impact of multiple hurricanes, drought, and crop failures in driving migration from the Northern Triangle (Banulescu-Bogdan, Malka, and Culbertson 2021).

In policymaking circles, one dominant narrative frames migration generally, and climate migration specifically, as a security threat. This story has been advanced by the border industrial complex and its success is evident in the massive growth of the Department of Homeland Security since 9/11. Another narrative mainstreamed by white supremacists and demagogic politicians and media figures uses “great replacement theory” to stir fear of a conspiracy to displace native-born white people with immigrants of color. A third narrative, while more positive than the first two, links migration to opportunity and argues that immigration benefits the country economically—but frames migration as a choice by individuals and families.

The first two narratives are demonstrably false but have enormous cultural potency. The third correctly lifts up the agency and contributions of immigrants, but it does not say anything about the structural and historical factors that lead people to choose to leave their home countries. It obscures the role of colonialism and neocolonialism, extractive economic policies, and US support for authoritarian regimes in forcing people to migrate.

Historian Greg Grandin (2010) summarizes some of the history of US policy in Latin America:

From the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, the U.S. military sharpened its fighting skills and developed its modern-day organizational structure largely in constant conflict with Latin America—in its drive west when it occupied Mexico in the mid-nineteenth century and took more than half of that country’s national territory. And in its push south: by 1930, Washington had sent gunboats into Latin American ports over six thousand times, invaded Cuba, Mexico (again), Guatemala, and Honduras, fought protracted guerilla wars in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Haiti, annexed Puerto Rico, and taken a piece of Colombia to create both the Panamanian nation and the Panama Canal. For their part, American corporations and financial houses came to dominate the economies of Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America, as well as large parts of South America, apprenticing themselves in overseas expansion before they headed elsewhere, to Asia, Africa, and Europe. . .

[After the Second World War] Latin America once again became a school where the United States studied how to execute imperial violence through proxies. After World War II, in the name of containing Communism, the United States, mostly through the actions of local allies, executed or encouraged coups in, among other places, Guatemala, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina and patronized a brutal mercenary war in Nicaragua. . . By the end of the Cold War, Latin American security forces trained, funded, equipped, and incited by Washington had executed a reign of terror—hundreds of thousands killed, an equal number tortured, millions driven into exile—from which the region has yet to fully recover. (Grandin 2010)

As with questions of race, the deliberate erasure of history has produced a distorted common sense about immigration.

As with questions of race, the deliberate erasure of history has produced a distorted common sense about immigration. The “immigrant threat narrative” competes against an “immigrant contributions narrative,” while both elide the deeper truth that migrant activists have articulated for many generations: “We are here because you were there”—that migration from countries in the Global South is the result of actions of countries in the Global North. The 1619 Project illuminated and popularized the deep history of anti-Black

racism in the US. A comparable effort to tell the deep history of nativism and the causes of immigration is much needed, but beyond the scope of this paper. We sketch some elements below in the context of the debate about climate migration.

An alternative to the three current dominant narratives would emphasize the historical roots and contemporary causes of migration. Scholars and activists invoke that history to contextualize migration as a necessary element of a plan to redress the harms of colonialism, resource extraction, and climate change (Achieme 2019). This larger historical view helps to justify plans for dramatically increased migration. Instead of seeing migration as an individual choice, we should see it as a powerful mechanism to repair historic and ongoing harms.

THE CASE FOR HAITI

In the fall of 2021, there was widespread outrage over videos distributed across social media showing US Border Patrol agents on horseback rounding up Haitian migrants and whipping them with their reins as they fled. Though the Biden administration condemned the visual imagery, advocates continue to raise concerns that nothing has changed in US policy with regard to the dehumanization and deportation of Haitian migrants (McDougall 2021; Niedzwiadek 2021).

Haiti is particularly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. One study dating back to 2011 identified Haiti as one of the three nations most vulnerable to such impacts (Carrington 2011). Factors contributing to this vulnerability include unstable governments, weak infrastructure, high rates of poverty, sea level rise, and the likelihood of more extreme weather events. Haiti lies in the Atlantic hurricane corridor and has experienced a higher incidence of both drought and extreme weather events, including flooding, that have impacted agricultural yields (Rubenstein 2012). Haiti's contribution to the world's greenhouse gas emissions is negligible when compared to the US and other rich countries. This exemplifies how developing nations in the Global South experience the worst effects of climate change caused primarily by the developed nations of the Global North (US AID 2012).

Haiti's socioeconomic woes are in large part driven by the actions of global powers—including the United States—on Haitian soil. First under the control of Spain and later France, Haiti was a plantation colony populated by enslaved people brought from Africa. In the late 18th century, enslaved people in Haiti successfully won their independence from France. Yet despite winning independence, Haiti's prospects for development were undermined by the actions of countries like France and the United States. A *New York Times* series on this topic explains the impact of the deal that Haiti was forced by France to accept to pay reparations to slaveholders. Later, the United States occupied Haiti from 1915 to 1934, extracting enormous wealth from the country during this time (Porter et al. 2022).

The story of Haitian migration to the United States over the last decade is complex. The migrants now coming to the US border are not necessarily being driven by the earthquake, Tropical Storm Grace, or the coup that took place in 2021. Recent Haitian migration at the US southern border is the result of a diaspora of migrants from Haiti displaced from the 2010 earthquake that led to more than 250,000 deaths and left more than 1.5 million people homeless. For more than a decade, these migrants have been in motion from Haiti to Brazil and Chile and then north through Colombia and Central American and on to the United States. In 2021, the United States apprehended approximately 30,000 Haitian migrants at its southern border. And that number has continued to grow in the first months of 2022. These migrants, after a decade of struggle, are being deported from the United States to a nation even less stable than the one they left (Yates 2021).

The more recent events in Haiti have sparked a new wave of migration by sea. Between October 2021 and May 2022, more than 4,400 Haitian migrants have been apprehended while attempting to reach the United States by boat (Chishti 2022).

The US approach to Haitian migration is a humanitarian disaster and a national embarrassment. Current US policy has led to disproportionate numbers of Haitians deported back to their home country even though Haiti is ill-prepared to receive them. Since September 2021, the United States has deported 25,000 migrants back to Haiti—4,000 in May of 2022 alone (Sullivan 2022). The US and France owe a massive debt to Haiti for past and present wrongs. A bold and humane immigration policy that welcomes many more Haitian refugees and asylum seekers would be an important down payment on that larger agenda of repair and redress.

It is strategic to emphasize the role of climate change as a driver of displacement and migration, both inside the United States and across borders. The effects of climate change are being felt now, and talking about climate change's role in driving migration opens up a larger conversation about the historical and structural causes of migration. Including climate change in the discussion will provide better framing for the decisions made by thousands of people to undertake difficult and dangerous journeys to seek refuge. Why are thousands of people risking their lives to travel across dangerous terrain? Are these individual choices by people to whom we have no special responsibility a threat to national security or to white political dominance? Or is the growing movement of people the result of neocolonial policies, particularly in the western hemisphere, and of climate change brought on by the decisions and norms of industrialized nations in the West?

A successful argument for expanded migration must enter what Stuart Hall aptly called the “popular morality,” which is the way in which everyday people make sense of the world (Hall 2021). This new story points to the US role in creating the conditions that force people to migrate. Put starkly, it asks whether someone who burns their neighbor's house down has an obligation to welcome them when they come knocking at the door seeking refuge.

In addition to taking responsibility for US contributions to climate change and thus for climate-induced migration, we also should consider how our stance toward migrants reflects on our character and identity as a country. The pro-migration narrative has historically focused on migrants—who they are and what they contribute to the country. A fresh narrative would start from a different place and ask: Who are we? What does our posture toward migrants say about us? This reframing grounds welcoming policies not in the question of how deserving migrants are but in terms of who we are and want to be. Immigration must be a part of the larger, unfolding national debate about racism and the country's history.

A fresh narrative would start from a different place and ask: Who are we? What does our posture toward migrants say about us?

Welcoming immigration policies must be grounded in a reckoning with the past, but also in an affirming vision of a multiracial, inclusive democracy. That positive vision has been upheld and renewed by many generations of Americans who have fought to achieve the progress we have made—including abolitionists, civil rights organizers, and generations of immigration rights campaigners. Situating the migration story in history provides important bridges to the stories we need to tell about the history of racism and avoids the trap of immigrant exceptionalism that has sometimes characterized immigration advocacy. As Jacqui Patterson puts it, “Whether it's the forced migration of the Transatlantic Slave Trade, or climate forced migration, the extractive economy is at the root of both” (Patterson 2022).

The new narrative also has a villain—those who profit from dividing us. Consistent with the race-class narrative, this story highlights the role of the border security complex that profits from an ever-expanding militarized response to migration. And it gives us a language to expose politicians and media figures who use racism and nativism to stoke fear and division for money

or votes. Furthermore, by tying nativism to extremism, authoritarianism, and political violence, this narrative also connects the pro-migrant agenda explicitly to the struggle for multiracial democracy. Just as authoritarianism is inherently nativist, so too multiracial democracy is necessarily welcoming.³

This new approach also embraces the positive aspects of our history. At times, often because of mass movements and sometimes by accident, the US has opened up to welcome immigrants. However partial or temporary those periods of progress were, both immigrants and native-born Americans benefited materially and culturally. As the country looks ahead to an aging population and demographic decline, expanded immigration offers the promise of national renewal. We need not ignore the crimes of the past and present in order to be optimistic. Rather, we can root a progressive vision in the best parts of the country's history and as central to the future. Historian Greg Grandin argued that Trump's proposal to build a wall at the southern border was culturally potent because it spoke to the end of the sense of limitless horizon that defined the white American imagination and character. Unlike the frontier, which symbolized ascendant, imperial whiteness, the wall is a symbol of besieged and cramped whiteness (Grandin 2019). The only way out of this decadent cultural cul-de-sac will be to turn outwards, to open and embrace the country's true history and its potential future.

An overarching narrative of historical reckoning and future possibility will need to encompass a variety of messages to engage various audiences to activate their welcoming impulse. The practical reality is that most people will not be recruited to a politics and policy of welcoming out of a grand reckoning with history. Many will be motivated by simple humanitarian considerations, feelings of solidarity, cultural and emotional affinity with immigrants, and some by direct economic interest. Once involved, people can be moved to deeper understandings of the history and the current reality of climate migration. The essential shift is to turn attention to who we are as a nation and to situate migration in a context of deep history. The common sense about migration today is that it is the result of millions of individual choices; a successful narrative shift therefore requires regrounding migration in time, as an outgrowth of history and as part of a shared, sustainable, and just future. Lifting up the role of climate change in driving mass migration is a linchpin for the success of that strategy because it is so vividly emblematic of the idea that "we are here because you were there."

³ It is no coincidence that the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act that eliminated racist national origin quotas was part of the larger civil rights revolution. Upsurges of nativism and anti-Black racism have gone together—as with the pact between the neo-Confederacy and nativist westerners that allied to roll back Reconstruction and enact the Chinese Exclusion Act (Ngai 2021).

THE STATUE OF LIBERTY PLAN: A NEW POLICY ARCHITECTURE FOR CLIMATE MIGRATION

The Statue of Liberty is a stirring symbol with deep cultural resonance. We would do well to leverage it, even if the promise of welcome to “huddled masses yearning to breathe free” has only been fitfully realized.

Current global and US immigration policy frameworks do not recognize the role of climate change in driving migration. Internationally, forced migration because of climate change does not confer protection under the 1951 Convention nor the 1967 protocol on the status of refugees. None of the existing pathways for migration to the US explicitly recognize displacement due to climate change as a valid reason for admission. (The box below outlines the Biden administration’s response to climate migration and what it could do using executive action in the near term.) Moreover, current migration limits are far below what is needed in terms of either the economic needs of the US in light of demographic decline or the needs of migrants.

THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION AND CLIMATE MIGRATION

In a major step, the Biden administration issued a “Report on the Impact of Climate Change on Migration” in October 2021—the first time the US government formally reported on the link between climate change and migration. The report is only a partial first step, but it does acknowledge the need for an overhaul of the structure, levels, and coordination of US foreign aid, and the lack of pathways for displaced people forced to migrate because of climate change. The report affirms that migration “can be a warranted adaptation strategy” (The White House 2021). Unfortunately, the report finds that “[t]he United States does not consider its international human rights obligations to require extending international protection to individuals fleeing the impact of climate change.”

However, the report does establish that:

[a]s a matter of policy, the United States does have a national interest in creating a new legal pathway for individualized humanitarian protection in the United States for individuals who establish that they are fleeing serious, credible threats to their life or physical integrity, including because of the direct or indirect impacts of climate change. This new legal pathway should be additive and in no way infringe upon or detract from existing protection pathways to the United States, including asylum and refugee resettlement.

Sweeping action to address climate migration will ultimately require action by Congress. For example, Refugees International proposed increased funding for disaster risk reduction (DRR) and climate change adaptation as well as amending the existing pathways to come to the US to offer protection for people affected by dire threats in their home countries, including the effects of climate change (Refugees International 2021).

There are important steps the Biden administration can take without Congress, as outlined by the International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP), including issuing a Department of Justice opinion that climate change can serve as grounds for people to claim refugee status under US law and broadening the applicability of the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program to include slow-onset disasters (International Refugee Assistance Project 2021).

The centerpiece of a new climate migration policy architecture is simple: We should welcome millions more people to the United States in the coming years.

The centerpiece of a new climate migration policy architecture is simple: We should welcome millions more people to the United States in the coming years. There are four reasons why dramatically increased migration is good policy.

First, the humanitarian impacts of restrictive migration policies in an era of climate disasters—rising deaths in the desert and at sea; impoverishment, abuse, and violence at the hands of cartels; and family separation—are already catastrophic and will only get worse. The “offshoring” of migration detention to third countries, a growing strategy in both Europe and the US, does not reduce the harm—it only places it further out of public view (see, for example, Granger 2022).

Second, given the role of the US in causing climate change, this nation bears a special responsibility to people in the Global South whose livelihoods are being disrupted. This recognition of responsibility is consistent with the broader emerging push to address historic and current injustices deriving from slavery. Scholars and activists have made the case for migration as a form of decolonization and reparations (Achiume 2019) aligned with programs of “repair and redress” to address racial injustice in the US (Strickland and Wong 2021; Darity and Mullen 2020).

Third, repressive immigration laws and a militarized border security state are inevitably disastrous for culture and policy. A “fortress democracy” is no democracy at all. The growth of the border security state abets “othering,” rising hate crimes against people of color already residing in the country, and questioning the legitimate political standing of minority groups. The expansion of the border security state also invites expanded surveillance and repression at home, as with the infamous deployment of Department of Homeland Security personnel to detain protestors in Portland in 2020. Most profoundly, the normalization of mass death, suffering, and brutality undermines the structures of feeling needed to nourish and sustain progressive governance (Bhargava 2021).

Fourth, given demographic change and the aging of the US population, the economy will benefit from a substantial influx of younger migrants. As discussed in the box below, US population growth has flatlined over the last decade, and this began even before the COVID-19 pandemic. The principal cause is declining births, though reduced migration has also been a factor. The ratio of working-age adults to retirees will become unsustainable in the absence of much more migration. Actuarial estimates by the Social Security Administration show that even modest increases in the level of net migration to the US result in a lower “dependency ratio,” extending the solvency of social security and Medicare (Social Security Administration 2021).

DEMOGRAPHIC DECLINE IN THE US

The country’s population growth rate has flatlined. Population growth between 2010 and 2020 was the second lowest in the country’s history. (It was only lower in the 1930s during the Great Depression.) And population growth between July 2020 and 2021 was the lowest it had been in the last 120 years (0.1 percent).

The main cause of this demographic decline is declining birth rates among native-born Americans. However, Trump’s nativist immigration policies also had an impact—reducing net immigration to the US from around a million per year previously to less than 25 percent of that (244,622) in 2020 and 2021.

The consequences of this demographic decline are serious. As William Frey, the demographer whose work we rely on, puts it:

One less flashy finding from the 2020 census is the fact that America’s under-age-18 population declined nationally (by one million) and in twenty-seven states during the 2010s. At the same time, the 65- to 74-year-old population is estimated to increase by almost half. This suggests that we could be facing elevated levels of what demographers call “age dependency,” in which the number of seniors starkly rises in relation to the people of working ages who must support them through taxes and national productivity. It is a far cry from the years when baby boomers themselves were young: In 1960, people under age 18 made up a whopping 35% of the U.S. population, dipping now to just 22%. (Frey 2021a)

There is nothing inherently progressive about population growth (or economic growth). However, an unsustainable ratio of retired to working-age Americans is already having huge consequences, most visibly in depopulated rural areas and a nationwide care crisis. Additionally, there is no sustainable future for Medicare or Social Security, as they are currently financed with a skewed dependency ratio.

DRAMATICALLY INCREASING MIGRATION LEVELS TO THE US

The central recommendation of this report is to dramatically expand immigration to the US over the next decade, setting ambitious new targets for admissions and establishing broader pathways through which new migrants might come. We also sketch four additional key elements of a successful welcoming policy to address climate migration.⁴

A choice about our national identity is at stake. Will the US be a closed society, bunkered behind moats and walls in which fear of “replacement” drives policy, politics, and culture? From across the non-authoritarian, non-nativist political spectrum, the answer must be a resounding no—to strengthen our democracy, to create a more humane and prosperous future, and to confront the challenges of climate change.

There is another way forward: We can dramatically expand migration levels in a way that is consistent with our country’s professed values. While the history of US policy toward migrants and refugees has often been brutal (Ngai 2004), welcoming immigrants remains a core element of the country’s narrative and identity that can and should be tapped. Migration is not only about *them* (those who migrate), but also about *us* (US residents who choose our response to migration). Because this question of national identity is so pivotal, we propose that the US should set out to become the most welcoming country on earth for migrants and refugees.

Progress toward achieving a national goal of becoming the most welcoming country on earth for migrants and refugees should be measured in a variety of ways, including the treatment of immigrants already residing in the US. For example, the failure

While the history of US policy toward migrants and refugees has often been brutal, welcoming immigrants remains a core element of the country’s narrative and identity that can and should be tapped.

⁴ This proposition does not replace or obviate the longstanding demand of the immigrant rights movement for a pathway to citizenship for the 11 million undocumented immigrants living in the United States today. Such action is necessary and long overdue. The challenges ahead, particularly in light of climate migration and the ascendance of nativist authoritarian movements in Western democracies, require a bold response that includes a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants currently residing in the US but also focuses on expanded future migration.

to create a pathway to citizenship for 11 million undocumented people in the United States has harmed generations of immigrants and fed the nativist backlash. During the pandemic, immigrants were hailed as “essential workers” and praised for their role in feeding and caring for the country, but policies to provide relief cruelly excluded immigrants. And full political and civil rights for immigrants, discussed below, are a critical yardstick to assess immigration policy.

For purposes of this report, which focuses on how to respond to the need for greater levels of future migration, we use the percentage of foreign-born residents as a proxy to measure the extent of welcoming across nations. A review of global data shows that by this standard, contrary to its self-image, the United States is not currently the most welcoming country on earth for immigrants and refugees. If we exclude small island nations and the Gulf oil-producing countries, which have huge migrant worker populations, the countries with the highest shares of foreign-born residents today are Australia (30.1 percent), Switzerland (28.8 percent), New Zealand (28.7 percent), and Canada (21.3 percent) (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division 2020).

There were 50.6 million foreign-born residents in the US in 2020, or 15.3 percent of the total US population. Becoming the most welcoming country on earth would entail doubling the current foreign-born share to over 30 percent. Assuming flat growth in natural population increase, the US would need to admit 75 million new immigrants to the country to cross that threshold.

If the US sought to achieve that target over a decade, the country would admit 7.5 million people each year. Before the Trump administration’s dramatic and effective curtailment of legal immigration, the US admitted roughly 1 million immigrants (net) to the US each year. What we propose here would therefore be a dramatic increase in immigration levels. However, this level of migration would generate annual population growth rates ranging between 1.8 and 2.2 percent over the course of a decade, levels that are comparable to the baby boom peak in 1950 (2.2 percent), and the period from 1900 to 1910 when the population grew around 2 percent each year for a decade (Frey 2021).

This plan calls for vastly greater migration to the United States, but it does not advocate “open borders.” Some open borders advocates on the libertarian right are motivated by a desire for cheap labor. Open borders advocates on the left, on the other hand, are motivated by values of equality and fairness—correctly noting the hypocrisy of a system in which capital can move freely across borders but people cannot. The problem is that open borders would effectively vitiate the nation-state, which is defined in part by agreements about who is and is not a member of the polity. The nation-state is a relatively new construct in human history, and we will undoubtedly need new forms of governance in this century that are at once more local and more global, particularly given the unprecedented challenge of climate change. But proposals to do away with the foundational principles of nation-state altogether are too far beyond the realm of current feasibility to be useful as a medium-term strategy. Popular support can be marshaled for generous welcoming policies, but the perception of unlimited and uncontrolled migration triggers fear and reduces support for immigration (Muñoz 2021). Welcoming immigration policies must be paired with control and limits, even if those limits are set at a very high level.

PATHWAYS FOR MIGRATION: EMPHASIZING HUMANITARIAN MIGRATION

One key question in determining immigration policies is what criteria should be used to admit prospective migrants. Currently, individuals migrate to United States through one of four pathways: employment visas for certain sectors of the economy and for people with special skills; family visas for relatives of US citizens and Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs); humanitarian visas for those fearing persecution or fleeing war; and diversity visas that favor people from parts of the world which have not historically sent many immigrants to the US. In 2017, before Trump slashed legal immigration, two-thirds of people who became Legal Permanent Residents (LPRs) did so on the basis of family ties, 13 percent were refugees and asylees, 12 percent gained admission with an employment-based visa, and 5 percent received “diversity visas” (Congressional Research Service 2019).

Five factors shape how we should design pathways for migration to the US:

1. Because of demographic decline, there is a sound economic argument for admitting more workers. However, current employment-based visa programs in the US have a long history of abuse by employers. Current programs tie workers to specific employers, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. These “guestworker” programs separate workers from their families and confer no political rights (Lederer 2022; Southern Poverty Law Center 2013). While there is little evidence that immigration in general lowers living standards for native-born workers (Milkman 2020), guestworker programs create a two-tiered labor market by introducing captive workers into specific industries with artificially suppressed wages and with few labor rights.⁵
2. Migrants’ value has historically been justified based on their contributions to the economy. While this is a valid consideration, it is likely that many migrants will not be able to work immediately because of age or because they have severe trauma that must first be addressed before entry into the workforce.⁶ Moreover, “merit-based” schemes for admitting immigrants, which are popular on the right, use rigid criteria to assess the potential economic contributions of migrants—ignoring the creativity of people who may

⁵ A recent *New Yorker* article (Stillman 2021) features a story of abuse of Indian temporary workers and organizer Saket Soni. The case is grotesque, but not atypical: “Soni soon got a call from an Indian pipe fitter. The man said that he had been promised a lucrative gig for a company called Signal International: he would receive a green card and temporary housing in comfortable quarters while he worked to repair Gulf Coast oil rigs damaged by the storm. He’d paid a labor broker more than ten thousand dollars for the opportunity. When he arrived, he found himself with a guest-worker visa, living with twenty-three other men in a labor camp, a squalid space the size of a double-wide trailer, paying more than a thousand dollars a month for the privilege. Soni and other organizers soon discovered that recruiters had ensnared hundreds of Indian laborers in a similar scheme. If the men protested, they were threatened with deportation; three of the group’s leaders were held under the watch of armed guards. Soni helped the workers travel to the White House and stage a hunger strike. Eventually, a broad coalition, including the American Civil Liberties Union and the Southern Poverty Law Center, sued, and secured one of the largest human-trafficking settlements in U.S. history: twenty million dollars, plus a formal apology from Signal International, which declared bankruptcy.”

⁶ We are indebted to Manuel Pastor for this insight, offered in comments at the Roosevelt Institute colloquium on climate migration in February 2022.

come to the US without advanced degrees. It is worth remembering that many Americans are descendants of immigrants who lacked higher education but contributed greatly in economic and non-economic ways to its development.

3. It is difficult to disentangle the motives of prospective migrants. For many, the drivers of migration include economic need, the effects of climate change, the threat of persecution and violence, and a desire to reunite with family members. Further, the distinction between migrants, refugees, and asylees is breaking down—both in the public imagination and in fact. And as climate change fuels conflict and war that prompts people to seek refuge abroad, it is harder and harder to classify migrants by category. These problems are compounded by the narrow criteria for admission in current pathways, which do not align with the complex motivations of prospective migrants.
4. US immigration policy is unique in the high value it places on family migration. This distinctive feature of US law recognizes that family unity is a positive good that contributes to vibrant communities and human well-being. Any system for expanded migration should preserve family preferences.
5. Because two-thirds of current migration comes through the family pathway, immigrants to the US currently mirror the ethnic profile of migrants already residing in the country, favoring migrants from Latin America and Asia. The diversity visa is a crucial way in which Black migrants, particularly from Africa, come to the US. Africa will have by far the largest population growth in this century of any continent and will face some of the worst climate effects of any region of the world. A progressive approach to future migration should center racial justice, and an expansion of the diversity visa is a crucial strategy in that regard.

In light of these factors, we propose that growth in future admissions come through three distinct pathways: the current family preference system, a dramatically expanded diversity visa program, and a revised and much larger humanitarian migration program that explicitly includes climate change as a factor in seeking admission. The family preference system is the bedrock of an immigration system that values immigrants' full humanity, rather than treating them purely instrumentally as sources of economic value, while the diversity visa program provides a mechanism to center racial justice in immigration policy.⁷ We do not propose to expand the employment-based visa programs, as the need for workers in the US can be met by expanded migration through other channels.

Humanitarian pathways should be reformed in several ways. First, we will need to remove obstacles deliberately erected by the Trump administration that prevent people from exercising their right to seek asylum. Second, we should acknowledge the legitimacy of economic hardship as a factor in seeking refuge in the US. And third, we should explicitly recognize climate change as a factor in

⁷ Nativist critics of immigration and corporate supporters of immigration have targeted the diversity and family preference pathways which we are proposing to maintain and expand. Corporate immigration advocates have sought to replace family immigration preferences with a "merit-based" system that would favor migrants with advanced degrees. Conservative immigration critics hostile to immigration from the Global South have attacked the diversity visa, which disproportionately benefits Black immigrants.

determining eligibility for prospective refugees and asylees. We think that expanded criteria for humanitarian pathways are preferable to a new “climate visa” program. Though a new pathway to admission based on climate impacts would provide a direct connection between narrative and policy architecture, it is often difficult to disentangle the relative importance of conflict, persecution, and hardship from the short- and long-term effects of climate change. We therefore believe that a new visa based solely on climate impacts would not reflect the complex lived experience of migrants and refugees.

This approach is vastly different from neoliberal immigration proposals, for example, the US Chamber of Commerce’s recent call to double legal migration through existing employment-based visa programs to reduce inflation (US Chamber of Commerce 2022). This business approach falsely assumes that inflation is caused mainly by rising wages and proposes a system for future migration that is specifically designed to create a captive workforce and a two-tier labor market. It is essential that future migrants are admitted with full civil and worker rights, the ability to bring family members, and the opportunity to naturalize and gain political rights.

The contrast between the neoliberal and progressive visions for increased migration was on stark display in the treatment of Haitian asylum seekers at the southern border. The Biden administration aggressively deported thousands of Haitians on up to seven flights a day and announced shortly thereafter an expansion of the abusive H2-B program for temporary workers with a set-aside for workers from Haiti and Central America. This jarring set of actions underlines that humanitarian pathways are far preferable for migrants and US workers (Hesson 2021; Miroff 2021).

In addition to dramatically increased migration, which is at the heart of the Statue of Liberty Plan, there are four other essential elements, which we briefly outline here.

1. INVESTMENTS IN IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION, EMPHASIZING THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

A substantial increase in migration will require a significant expansion of both government and civil society support. This will entail support from the government for transitional income and housing, job readiness, English-learning programs, language access, and services targeted to people who have experienced trauma in their home countries or on the journey to the US. The significant upfront costs will pay for themselves in the long run through expanded economic activity, and in the short run could easily be financed by reducing funding for the border security state.

Welcoming immigrants at this scale will also require a massive civil society response. According to one estimate, during the recent German experience welcoming Syrian refugees, 50 percent of Germans undertook some kind of activity to help integrate newcomers (Rogers 2021). The US also has a long history of this kind of civil society mobilization, from settlement houses in the early part of the 20th century to today’s robust immigrant organizing and service infrastructure. Prospective immigrants coming through family pathways today have sponsors in the US, while refugees are supported by refugee resettlement agencies. Sponsorship and resettlement are crucial building blocks for integration on a larger scale.

2. POLICIES THAT ENABLE PROSPECTIVE MIGRANTS TO STAY IN THEIR HOME COUNTRIES

Immigrant rights advocates have rightly foregrounded a “right to stay” in a future migration agenda (Hincapie 2021), and environmental justice leader Michelle Martinez has proposed the idea of home—a right to a place to live—as an axis for intersectional movement building (Martinez 2022). US support of authoritarian regimes and trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has caused violence and massive economic dislocation in this hemisphere and has been a major contributor to mass migration. The first obvious, but difficult, step will be for the US to end economic and foreign policies that contribute to migration pressures.

Beyond that, there is an affirmative imperative to enable people who wish to stay in their home countries to do so. Given the disproportionate role of the US in generating carbon emissions, there is a compelling moral case for such assistance. This is also consistent with the rhetoric (but not the reality) of global climate discussions, which have in recent years begun to address “loss and damage”—what the Global North owes to the Global South to remediate the irreversible damage of climate change. Seven countries that were the biggest emitters of greenhouse gasses, including the United States, spent at least twice as much on border and immigration enforcement as they did on climate finance, while the US spent 11 times more (Miller, Buxton, and Akkerman 2021). One key area for future research is how such assistance can be effectively delivered in a context in which aid to national governments often does not reach the local level and intended beneficiaries (Soanes, Rai, Steele, Shakya, and Macgregor 2021).

3. DECONSTRUCTING THE BORDER SECURITY STATE AND TERMINATING THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

We have paid a heavy financial and moral price for the misguided “global war on terror” and the creation of the massive and sprawling Department of Homeland Security (Ackerman 2021). The integration of immigration into homeland security has had particularly noxious consequences, inevitably framing immigration as a matter of national security rather than as a major component of national renewal.

We spend vastly more on immigration enforcement than we do to enforce civil rights or worker rights laws (Bhargava and Hertel-Fernandez 2021). The border security and surveillance industry has grown hand in hand with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In response to every panic about migration at the southern border, the industry has created new (or repurposed) military tools to attempt to harden the border—and has sought to expand the border security and surveillance apparatus further into the interior. Any anticipated rise in migration, whatever the cause, is framed as a border and national security crisis—even when the migrants in question are children seeking to be reunited with their families living in the United States. Such militarized responses further heighten fear and insecurity at the border, which is then magnified by right-wing nativists and opportunistic political leaders, who demonstrate their fealty to immigration

opponents by calling for more funding for border security. With more resources than they can absorb, DHS regularly contracts immigration enforcement, surveillance, and construction to private corporations. The cycle of fear, militarized response, increased funding, and corporate profit is a textbook example of corporate capture.

A radical reduction of spending on the border security state and a commensurate increase in spending for integration, processing, and legal representation would have the additional value of defunding the private corporations that are currently profiteering from detaining and surveilling immigrants. But we should pursue even more far-reaching reforms.

DHS is not an eternal feature of the government—it is just over two decades old, founded to prosecute the disastrous “War on Terror” after 9/11. As Rep. Pramila Jayapal (D-WA) persuasively argues, the agency should now be terminated (Jayapal 2021). Given the scale of the Statue of Liberty Plan, we need a new cabinet-level strategy and agency that takes the responsibilities of the US Citizenship and Immigration Services away from the Department of Homeland Security. Its cultural orientation would be to welcome and integrate immigrants, not to police them.

4. INCORPORATING IMMIGRANTS INTO A CLIMATE RESILIENCE AGENDA

Immigrants already residing in the US are on the frontline of the response to climate change, both because they often settle in regions subject to climate disasters and because they work in industries (such as agriculture) that are affected by extreme weather. Immigrants are often excluded from disaster assistance because they are undocumented. Yet, immigrant workers are the backbone of the growing industry to clean up after climate disasters and to upgrade community infrastructure to be more resilient.

An agenda to fully include immigrants in a climate agenda would ensure full access to disaster relief and protection from immigration enforcement. It would address the needs of immigrant workers by reshaping the growing resilience industry to end rampant exploitation and abuse of immigrant and other vulnerable workers, who are subject to dangerous and unhealthy conditions when cleaning up after disasters (Soni 2021; Melaku 2022).

MOVEMENT-BUILDING STRATEGIES: BUILDING A WELCOME CULTURE AND A WELCOMING COALITION

There is a massive latent constituency for welcoming policies in the United States that needs to be organized. Understanding the interests and entry points for different constituencies, activating them, and forging coalitions will require practical and sustained work.

Admittedly, building a mass movement to respond to climate migration by expanding immigration faces distinctive challenges. The most direct beneficiaries of a significantly expanded immigration policy live outside the borders of the United States and have little direct political leverage. Success will depend on building and expanding a broad alliance of social forces to push for change. A useful historical analogy is the mass movement to abolish the slave trade that galvanized thousands of people to pressure Parliament to act in the United Kingdom in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. That movement would not have been successful without the direct action of enslaved people—for example, during the Haitian revolution—and the powerful organizing, testimony, and leadership of formerly enslaved people like Oludah Equiano. But also crucial was the action taken by thousands of workers, people of faith, and others in the UK who used a broad range of tactics from boycotts to petitioning to mass meetings over many years, which helped bring about the end of the slave trade (Hochschild 2005).

There are two critical steps to build a broad base of support for expanded migration in the US. First, key sectors of society with emotional ties and interests in expanded migration must be activated to press for it. Second, thousands of people need to be engaged in the practical work of welcoming immigrants. There are several key constituencies with an affinity and interest in expanded migration.

It should first be noted that liberal politicians, political parties, and community groups do themselves no favors by taking for granted or assuming the political affinity of immigrants living in the United States. Nativist movements have contested for affinity with immigrants in the United States using the same dominant narratives we seek to contest in this report, adding individualistic nuances about which immigrants came to the United States “the right way.” Demography is not destiny—yet another fallacy inherent in the right’s embrace of replacement theory. However, the growing foreign-born and second-generation immigrant population in the United States presents a key opportunity. Children of immigrants have played a significant role in winning previous

liberalizations of immigration laws and pushing for civil rights (Ngai 2021). As the children of immigrants and their children come of age in the coming years and decades in a world shaped by climate change, they can play a leading role in a broader progressive coalition.

1. **The Immigrant Rights Movement.** There is a robust and powerful movement for immigrant rights in the United States today, but the current political context has frustrated the movement's aspirations on multiple occasions. The two main goals of the immigrant rights movement have been challenging harsh immigration enforcement policies and winning a path to citizenship for 11 million undocumented immigrants living in the United States.

But as Amaha Kassa (2021) argues, the movement must embrace expanded future migration as a central priority while continuing work on those fronts. This refreshed focus will have the benefit of expanding who finds belonging in the immigrant rights movement, put the movement on offense, activate the internationalist identity of the movement, and position the movement at the heart of the struggle for multiracial democracy, which is the defining fight of our generation.

2. **The Environmental Movement.** The environmental movement needs immigrants, and immigrants need the environmental movement. Years of public opinion research demonstrate greater and consistent support for strategies to reduce carbon emissions and conserve natural resources among communities of color than among white voters (Ballew et al. 2020; Latimer 2016). Immigrants—including those driven by climate change impacts to leave their homes—are a natural core constituency of the environmental movement. In efforts to curb carbon emissions, people displaced by climate change are compelling and powerful advocates for action because their relationship to climate change is real, not theoretical.

Mainstream, white-led environmental groups have a tortured history on the topic of immigration. Some of the leading founders of major green groups were openly racist (Associated Press 2021). Environmental groups have at times used scarcity frames that pit the conservation of natural resources against population growth and immigration. This distance between the “big greens” and communities of color has been exacerbated by the tendency among white environmental organizations to pursue technocratic solutions to carbon reduction, often deprioritizing action on the real impact of pollution and climate change on frontline communities.

But today, environmentalism is undergoing a sea change. Partly in response to the energy behind multiracial, youth-led climate activism, some of the big greens have made efforts to reckon with the past, connect with racial justice movements, and change their programmatic work to engage communities of color. There are promising new opportunities for intersectional organizing.

- 3. The Environmental Justice Movement.** Environmental justice groups have long advanced a broad, intersectional social vision, and immigrants are a core constituency for many organizations in this space. Bold new policy frameworks such as “just transition” and the Green New Deal have linked action on climate change and social justice, and leadership for these efforts has come from communities of color.⁸

Yet environmental justice groups working in immigrant communities have often focused on frontline impacts of pollution, not on how or why immigrants live in their communities. This is changing as environmental justice groups and environmental groups with an orientation to social justice, like 350.org, have begun to collaborate with immigrant groups to define an agenda on climate migration. Many immigrant groups are also now organizing at the intersection of climate and migration (Melaku 2021; Boeve 2021). Immigration and climate justice are two linked issues that demand an internationalist politics—and they will become defining elements of progressive politics in this century.

- 4. Unions.** The debate over immigration in the labor movement is far different today than it was 30 years ago. Most labor leaders and unions recognize the importance of raising working conditions and standards for all workers, irrespective of immigration status. There is broad support for a path to citizenship for undocumented workers.⁹ There is also an openness within the labor movement to expanded migration through humanitarian pathways. This stands in contrast to justifiable concerns over the role of temporary worker programs and work-based visa programs that risk undercutting US workers (Lederer 2022).

Today, the political power of the labor movement is challenged by the appeal of right-wing political movements animated by nativism and their resonance among working class voters. The ability of the right wing to split working class voters weakens the political power of labor unions seeking better working conditions for their members. Advocating for vastly expanded migration will be an important step for the labor movement; failing to do so risks ceding to nativists the immigrant threat narrative and allowing them to shift attention away from the corporations and powerful interest groups who are responsible for growing income inequality and its impact on US workers. Some unions are already serving as hubs for the integration of new immigrants—for example, by establishing hiring halls and providing support for naturalization—and they offer a model for the future (Lederer, 2022; Medina, 2021; Taylor, 2021).

- 5. Racial Justice Movements.** Alliances between immigrant and Black communities are critical. Historically, the fates of Black Americans and immigrants have been linked. Opponents of racial justice and immigration have worked closely together and often been the same people. After the fall of Reconstruction, the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act

⁸ See Just Transition Alliance n.d., and Hockett and Gunn-Wright 2019.

⁹ The story of the transformation of the labor movement from nativism to welcoming is fascinating and instructive. Active organizing inside the labor movement, and in partnership with community allies, was essential to bring about the historic reversal of policy at the AFL-CIO in 2000 (Medina 2021; Taylor 2021).

was made possible by an alliance of western and southern white supremacists inside and outside Congress. And the liberalization of immigration laws in the 1960s depended on the larger civil rights revolution, which created a context in which racial quotas were no longer defensible.

There is a practical basis for this alliance. As discussed in the box below, internal displacement of people within the United States due to climate change is already happening and will accelerate in coming decades. Black and Indigenous people and other people of color will be disproportionately affected. Linking the needs of internally displaced, vulnerable people to the interests of climate migrants can provide a bridge.

As nativism and racism have become the principal weapons of ascendant authoritarianism in the US, they have made possible—though not inevitable—the creation of a broad front led by communities of color to defend and improve multiracial democracy (Phillips 2018). At the level of policy, such an alliance will entail including migration explicitly in visions of a just transition and a Green New Deal and prioritizing Black migrants in plans for expanded migration.

UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLIMATE-CAUSED MIGRATION AND INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

The United States lacks a coherent strategy to manage internal displacement caused by fast- and slow-onset climate disasters. Without a plan that centers communities, we are facing a looming internal displacement and human rights crisis for vulnerable communities in the United States (Bronen 2021).

Climate change is already displacing people inside the United States. People forced to move because of climate-related slow-onset and high-intensity events include individuals bought out by FEMA following major natural disasters in the United States (about 43,000 properties since the 1980s) (Weber and Moore 2019). It also includes individuals who abandon their properties to sea level rise, and others who are temporarily displaced by hurricanes and wildfires, who may or may not return. Typically, individuals forced to make unplanned moves are moving to neighboring counties, likely to be more urban and with better access to public benefits and other resources (Martin 2019). In some cases, entire communities are working to move together—for example, tribal villages relocating due to sea level rise in Alaska, Louisiana, and Washington State.

Though we focus in this paper on potential US responses to international displacement and migration across national borders, climate-caused displacement is already an issue inside the United States and will impact more people in coming years, disproportionately from lower-income and BIPOC communities.

A priority for future research should be to understand both the impact of climate change on frontline communities facing displacement and what can be done to facilitate the movement of individuals and communities in a way that respects human rights and takes into consideration the devastating costs of relocation. An intentional strategy could bridge the interests of frontline communities—including immigrant communities—facing displacement in the United States and those the United States will welcome from other countries. Failing to address internal displacement and ignoring the linked experiences of those displaced by climate change domestically and internationally could unnecessarily pit impacted communities against each other.

There are actions that can be taken now.

We can build on organizing models developed by tribal communities and environmental justice organizations in frontline communities to monitor the impact of slow-onset climate impacts (e.g., sea level rise) or rapid-onset disasters (e.g., wildfire, flooding, landslides) to generate awareness and convene communities around planning decisions related to adaptation. Government agencies at the state and local level, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) in particular, should invest in these community-led and designed processes (Bronen 2021).

Consistent with the age-old adage “if you want a friend, be a friend,” there are actions that the broader environmental justice and immigrant rights movements can take now to support communities, including tribal communities, confronted with sea level rise and other climate-related slow-onset disasters. The approaches taken by tribal communities in states like Alaska, Louisiana, and Washington may create new models that build resilient infrastructure, prevent impoverishment, and respect community integrity, human rights, and tribal sovereignty.

- 6. Faith Communities.** It is impossible to conceive of a successful movement for expanded migration without leadership from faith communities. Religious groups have long been the backbone of welcoming efforts in the US, evidenced by their work anchoring refugee resettlement efforts in the United States. They have been core parts of movements to establish protections to immigrant communities, including through the Sanctuary Movement of the 1980s. Expanding welcoming efforts in faith communities—and intentionally engaging the diversity of faith communities, including Evangelical, Catholic, Mormon, Protestant, Muslim, Jewish, and other religious faiths—is a natural way to build a broader constituency for expanded immigration.

Immigration also has potential advocates in otherwise conservative terrain. For example, for the Southern Baptist Convention, immigration has emerged as one pathway to bring more families into their pews. For evangelical churches with direct connections to immigrant communities—including their home countries through overseas evangelical and humanitarian engagement—the immigrant faithful are seen as a source of renewal (Castleberry 2015).

- 7. LGBTQ+ Communities.** The profusion of anti-trans and “don’t say gay” bills around the country has underlined the extent to which equality in the US remains contested terrain. Immigrant communities and LGBTQ+ communities share a common enemy in the purveyors of poisonous “great replacement” theories, which link restrictive immigration policies with anti-LGBTQ+ policies and policies to restrict reproductive freedom. Moral panics about declining birth rates among native-born populations are a key driver of far-right politics in the US and Europe.

Despite current attacks on vulnerable LGBTQ+ and especially trans communities, the US remains a prized destination for LGBTQ+ people fleeing persecution. But US asylum processes often fail LGBTQ+ people (Huppert 2021). By elevating the need for expanded humanitarian pathways for LGBTQ+ migrants, the Statue of Liberty Plan offers a material basis for unity and a cultural rebuke to the cramped notions of citizenship that would exclude them.

- 8. Business Interests.** Demographic trends in the United States are unsustainable (see box on page 20). The ratio of working-age adults to retirees will ultimately force expanded immigration onto the political agenda. The US Chamber of Commerce has already called for a significant increase in immigration through existing employment visa programs that exploit immigrant workers and tie employees to employers. Will a neoliberal paradigm or a progressive paradigm for expanded migration prevail? Will it be possible for businesses to find common cause with unions, immigrant groups, and others seeking increased admissions through humanitarian pathways for migration into the United States? This is a crucial question, since the possibility of action on immigration would increase if a portion of the business community cared enough about the issue to expend political capital on it. Whether expanded immigration looks more like the neoliberal, low-road model or the progressive, high-road one will depend on the strength and bargaining power of the progressive coalition.

We must start this work now. The fight to significantly expand future migration will require that large numbers of Americans feel a direct connection to immigration and immigrants. Accomplishing this will require a massive commitment to engage a range of civil society organizations that sponsor and resettle immigrants. There is a compelling case for government assistance to be delivered by NGOs rooted in immigrant communities and in organizations and institutions in every walk of life. The range of civil society organizations involved in resettlement and integration should be expanded beyond the core of faith-based groups that lead this work now. The range of constituencies listed above—such as labor unions, businesses, community organizations, LGBTQ+ organizations, women’s groups, and others—can play a vital role.

As the work of Welcome.US with Afghan refugees suggests, there is immense potential to recruit unusual suspects to this work, including mainstream civic organizations and businesses, whose engagement can play a key role in broadening support for immigration and bridging cultural and political divides (Muñoz and Bridgeland 2022). This bridging work might be further strengthened by undertaking a massive national service initiative that supports young people to work with

immigrant-serving organizations, including people who are from parts of the country that have not historically received large numbers of immigrants. The activation of civil society to welcome immigrants is critical for mass immigration to function as a strategy of national renewal. The community infrastructure created through this process of welcoming will be essential to enable the US to achieve and sustain the kind of expanded immigration levels envisioned in the Statue of Liberty Plan.

In addition to vastly increasing welcoming infrastructure, two more key actions can be taken now to build the movement.

- **Invest in political education.** Beyond immigrant communities and academic circles, there is little understanding of the exploitative relationship between the United States and the nations that migrants to the United States come from. Similarly, the public is largely unaware of the disproportionate role of the US as a contributor to climate change and the severe effects on countries in the Global South. Across civil society organizations and through digital and broadcast media channels, immigrants and their allies must use the tools of popular education and mass media to generate a new understanding of the responsibility the United States has—as a consequence of colonialism and carbon emissions—to nations in the Global South experiencing the worst effects of climate change.
- **Organize interventions in natural disasters.** We know that the rate and intensity of climate-related natural disasters will increase in coming years. Rather than passively observing these events, we can actively intervene—by supporting the coordination of financial support and mutual aid, by communicating the historical relationship of the United States to the impacted country, by advocating for humanitarian strategies that can support rebuilding, and by promoting immigration benefits and forms of immigration relief for individuals and families that are already in the United States or forced to move. Every natural disaster should be an educational event to raise public consciousness of what connects that nation and its people to our own nation's history and actions.

CONCLUSION

The accelerating displacement and migration of millions of people, increasingly because of climate change, is one of the defining megatrends of this century. The new scale of human movement across borders is meeting entrenched patterns of economic domination, white supremacy, and the use of nativism for profit and political gain. The challenge before us calls for imagination, savvy, and openheartedness in equal measure.

A bold vision for a progressive response to climate migration is essential to the success of the larger agenda for economic justice, racial justice, and democracy. Historian Mae Ngai points out that waves of nativism typically occur not in times of overall economic contraction but when there are large sectoral shifts in the economy, and when think tanks, media, and politicians develop and popularize anti-immigrant theories (Ngai 2021). Compounding other sectoral shifts, climate change will force immense economic dislocation—and the nativist movement today has a big megaphone. In the absence of a coherent and forceful response, we can be sure that under these conditions, nativism will metastasize and devour the country's political discourse. Embracing expanded immigration is important on its own terms, but it is now central to the progressive projects of defending multiracial democracy and advancing economic justice.

It is also true that vastly greater levels of migration are not achievable nor sustainable if most native-born people are experiencing precarity and insecurity. The Statue of Liberty Plan can only succeed if yoked to a broader, progressive economic and racial justice agenda. Measures to establish economic security for native-born and immigrant workers and their families will not guarantee receptivity to greater levels of migration, as demonstrated by the rising tide of nativism in countries with strong social welfare states, such as in Scandinavia (Traub 2021; Piser 2019). But they are surely necessary for sustained broad public support.

The path of progress for the immigrant rights movement lies in a deep, principled, and intersectional coalition with movements for racial justice, worker rights, climate justice, and LGBTQ+ equality.

The stakes are high not only for current and future migrants and refugees but for all of us. Virulent, racist nativism is corroding our civic life, our culture, and our politics. In the absence of a compelling alternative paradigm, it will only gain more power as climate change forces more people to move in search of safety and livelihoods. Rising authoritarianism and white nationalism have clarified that immigration is not just another policy issue—it defines the substance and meaning of our national identity and of multiracial democracy. US immigration policy has fallen far short of the country's flattering but inaccurate self-image as a "nation of immigrants"—just as the country's founding myths are contradicted by its deep history of racism. Achieving the Statue of Liberty Plan depends on acknowledging

the gap between rhetoric and reality, and reckoning with the US role in creating the conditions for mass migration. The path of progress for the immigrant rights movement lies in a deep, principled, and intersectional coalition with movements for racial justice, worker rights, climate justice, and LGBTQ+ equality. And immigration must be addressed in the context of the larger racial reckoning that movements for racial justice have initiated.

The good news is that a new paradigm is available to us—in fact, it is emergent. The brutal nativism of the Trump years brought thousands of people to the streets to protest the Muslim ban and the separation of children from their parents at the US southern border. For the first time, more people supported higher migration than lower migration to the US (Gallup 2022). Thousands of people across the political spectrum have acted to welcome refugees into their homes and communities.

And the exceptions to the nativist consensus, from Germany's welcome of Syrian refugees to the US response to Afghan refugees, show that this can be done. One might argue that the conditions in these cases were exceptional, but some of the factors are reproducible. We can build a broad civil society network to welcome migrants that helps to build a "welcome culture." We can shape a narrative about migration generally and climate migration specifically that highlights the responsibility of Global North countries, including the US, in creating the conditions that drive people to migrate. We can make nativists toxic by tying them to dangerous far-right movements that use violence. We can embrace migration as part of our national identity, as essential to multiracial democracy, and as a driver of national renewal.

Underneath the frozen surface of today's chilly nativist consensus, warm currents are moving new ideas to the surface.

REFERENCES

- Abou-Chadi, Tarik. 2019. "Why Germany—and Europe—Can't Afford to Accommodate the Radical Right." *Washington Post*, September 4, 2019, sec. Opinion. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/09/04/why-germany-europe-cant-afford-accommodate-radical-right/>.
- Achieme, E. Tendayi. 2019. "Migration as Decolonization." *Stanford Law Review* 71, no. 6 (June): 1509–1574. <https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/migration-as-decolonization/>.
- Ackerman, Spencer. 2021. *Reign of Terror: How the 9/11 Era Destabilized America and Produced Trump*. New York: Viking.
- Agarwal, Nisha. 2022. "Response to Social Democracy Piece." (response paper for Roosevelt Institute climate migration colloquium, February 24, 2022).
- Azemun, Mehrdad, and Adam Kruggel. 2021. "We Have Found the Enemy and It Is Not Each Other: Deep Canvassing to Change Hearts and Minds on Immigration in Rural and Small-Town America," in *Immigration Matters: Movements, Visions, and Strategies for a Progressive Future*, edited by Ruth Milkman, Deepak Bhargava, and Penny Lewis, 271–286. New York, NY: New Press.
- Bale, Tim. 2018. "To Defeat Far-Right Nationalists, Don't Try to Imitate Them." *The New York Times*, July 16, 2018, sec. Opinion. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/16/opinion/to-defeat-far-right-nationalists-dont-try-to-imitate-them.html>.
- Ballew, Matthew, Edward Maibach, John Kotcher, Parrish Bergquist, Seth Rosenthal, Jennifer Marlon, and Anthony Leiserowitz. 2020. *Which Racial/Ethnic Groups Care Most About Climate Change?* New Haven, CT: Yale Program on Climate Change Communication. <https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/race-and-climate-change/>.
- Banulescu-Bogdan, Natalia, Haim Malka, and Shelly Culbertson. 2021. *How We Talk About Migration: The Link Between Migration Narratives, Policy, and Power*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/migration-narratives-policy-power>.
- Bhargava, Deepak. 2021. "Social Democracy or Fortress Democracy?: A Twenty-First Century Immigration Plan." *New Labor Forum* 30, no. 3 (August). <https://newlaborforum.cuny.edu/2021/08/26/social-democracy-or-fortress-democracy-a-twenty-first-century-immigration-plan/>.
- Blitzer, John. 2019. "How Climate Change is Fueling the U. Border Crisis." *The New Yorker*, April 3, 2019. <https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/how-climate-change-is-fuelling-the-us-border-crisis>.

- Boeve, May. 2022. "Response to Statue of Liberty Plan." (response paper for Roosevelt Institute climate migration colloquium, New York, February 24, 2022).
- Bronen, Robin. 2021. "Rights, Resilience and Community-led Relocation: Creating a National Governance Framework." *The Harbinger* 45 (April). https://socialchangenyu.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Robin-Bronen_RLSC-The-Harbinger_45.pdf.
- Broning, Michael. 2018. "Europe's Left Turns Right on Immigration," *Project Syndicate*, June 19, 2018. <https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/europe-center-left-parties-immigration-policy-by-michael-broening-2018-06>.
- Carrington, Damian. 2011. "Map Reveals Stark Divide in Who Caused Climate Change and Who's Being Hit." *The Guardian*, October 26, 2011, sec. Environment. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/damian-carrington-blog/2011/oct/26/climate-change-developing-country-impacts-risk?CMP=twt_gu.
- Castleberry, Joseph. 2015. *The New Pilgrims: How Immigrants Are Renewing America's Faith and Values*. New York: Worthy Books.
- Chishti, Muzaffar and Jessica Bolter. 2022. "Rise in Maritime Migration to the United States Is a Reminder of Chapters Past." *Migration Information Source* (blog). Migration Policy Institute. May 25, 2022. <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/maritime-migration-united-states-rise>.
- Clement, Viviane, Kanta Kumari Rigaud, Alex de Sherbinin, Bryan Jones, Susana Adamo, Jacob Schewe, Nian Sadiq, and Elham Shabahat. 2021. *Groundswell: Acting on Internal Climate Migration, Part II*. Washington, DC: The World Bank. <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/540941631203608570/pdf/Overview.pdf>.
- Crawford, Robert. 2021. "The Politics of Belonging: Refugees, Islam, and Germany's Far Right." Political Research Associates, August 19, 2021. PRA. <https://politicalresearch.org/2021/08/19/politics-belonging>.
- Darity, William A., Jr., and A. Kirsten Mullen. 2020. *From Here to Equality: Reparations for Black Americans in the Twenty-First Century*. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press.
- de Haas, Hein. 2020. "Climate Migration: The fabrication of a migration threat." Hein de Haas (blog). January 31, 2020. <http://heindehaas.blogspot.com/2020/01/climate-refugees-fabrication-of.html>.
- de Sherbinin, Alex. 2020. "Climate Impacts as Drivers of Migration." *Migration Information Source* (blog). Migration Policy Institute. October 23, 2020. <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/climate-impacts-drivers-migration>.
- Edsall, Thomas B. 2022. "Where Does All That Hate We Feel Come From?" *New York Times*, April 27, 2022, sec. Opinion. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/27/opinion/rich-poor-immigration-fear.html>.

- Farer, Tom. 2019. *The Case for Liberalism with Borders*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Ferris, Elizabeth. 2021. "Climate Migrants Can't Wait for Global Frameworks." *Wilson Quarterly* (Fall). https://www.wilsonquarterly.com/quarterly/_/climate-migrants-cant-wait-for-global-frameworks.
- Frey, William H. 2021a. *America's Shrinking White Population Needs to Value Youthful Diversity*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/u-s-population-growth-has-nearly-flatlined-new-census-data-shows/>.
- Frey, William H. 2021b. *U.S. Population Growth Has Nearly Flatlined, New Census Data Shows*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/u-s-population-growth-has-nearly-flatlined-new-census-data-shows/>.
- The Gallup Organization. 2022. "Immigration." <https://news.gallup.com/poll/1660/immigration.%20aspx>.
- Grandin, Greg. 2010. *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.
- Grandin, Greg. 2019. *The End of the Myth: From the Frontier to the Border Wall in the Mind of America*. New York: Macmillan.
- Granger, Max. 2022. "As Europe Welcomes Ukrainian Migrants, It Leaves Other Migrants Caught 'Between Two Deaths.'" *The Intercept*, March 8, 2022. <https://theintercept.com/2022/03/08/ukraine-refugees-europe-border-policy-libya-sally-hayden/>.
- Hall, Stuart. 2021. *The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left*. London: Verso.
- Haney-Lopez, Ian. 2014. *Dog Whistle Politics: How Coded Racial Appeals Have Reinvented Politics and Wrecked the Middle Class*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hertel-Fernandez, Alexander and Deepak Bhargava. 2021. "Looking Ahead: Enforcement for the Many, Not the Few." *Democracy: A Journal of Ideas*, no. 60. <https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/special-symposium/overview-enforcement-for-the-many-not-the-few/>.
- Hesson, Ted. 2021. "Biden to Raise Number of Guest Worker Visas, with More for Haiti, Central America." *Reuters*, December 20, 2021.
- Hincapie, Marielena. 2021. "Five Freedoms: A Twenty-First-Century Policy Vision for Immigrant Rights," in *Immigration Matters: Movements, Visions, and Strategies for a Progressive Future*, edited by Ruth Milkman, Deepak Bhargava, and Penny Lewis, 151–165. New York: New Press.
- Hockett, Robert C., and Rhiana Gunn-Wright. 2019. "The Green New Deal: Mobilizing for a Just, Sustainable and Prosperous Economy." *Cornell Legal Studies Research Paper* no. 19-09, available at SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3342494.

- Huppert, Nora, and Jennifer C. Pizer. 2021. "The Hope and Incompleteness of Pride: LGBTQ Refugees are Repeatedly Denied the Right to the Complexity of their Identities and Lives." *Lambda Legal* (blog). June 28, 2021. https://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20210628_lgbtq-refugees-are-repeatedly-denied-the-right-to-the-complexity-of-their-identities-and-lives.
- International Displacement Monitoring Center. 2021. *Global Report on Internal Displacement: Internal Displacement in a Changing Climate*. Geneva: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC). https://www.internal-displacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/grid2021_idmc.pdf.
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 2022. *Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability*. Bremen, Germany: IPCC. <https://www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment-report-working-group-ii/>.
- International Refugee Assistance Project (IRAP). 2021. *US Opportunities to Address Climate Displacement*. New York: IRAP. <https://refugeerights.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/US-Opportunities-to-Address-Climate-Displacement.pdf>.
- Jayapal, Pramila. 2021. "The Progressive Path Forward on Immigration Policy," in *Immigration Matters: Movements, Visions, and Strategies for a Progressive Future*, edited by Ruth Milkman, Deepak Bhargava, and Penny Lewis, 235–252. New York: New Press.
- Just Transition Alliance. N.d. "What Is Just Transition?" Accessed July 28, 2022. <https://jtalliance.org/what-is-just-transition/#>.
- Kassa, Amaha. 2021. "Keep It Moving: A Future Flow Agenda for the Immigrant Rights Movement," in *Immigration Matters: Movements, Visions, and Strategies for a Progressive Future*, edited by Ruth Milkman, Deepak Bhargava, and Penny Lewis, 187–204. New York: New Press.
- Krastev, Ivan. 2020. *After Europe*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Krause, Werner, Denis Cohen, and Tarik Abou-Chadi. 2022. "Does Accommodation Work? Mainstream Party Strategies and the Success of Radical Right Parties." *Political Science Research and Methods* 1–8. www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/5C3476FCD26B188C7399ADD920D71770/S2049847022000085a.pdf/does-accommodation-work-mainstream-party-strategies-and-the-success-of-radical-right-parties.pdf.
- Latimer, Brian. 2016. "Polls Show Most Latinos Back Strong Environmental Policies." *NBC News*, December 14, 2016. <https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/polls-show-most-latinos-back-strong-environmental-policies-n695926>.
- Lederer, Shannon. 2022. "Fortress Democracy — Response." (response paper for Roosevelt Institute climate migration colloquium, New York, February 24, 2022).
- Lustgarten, Abrahm. 2020a. "Where Will Everyone Go?" *ProPublica*, July 23, 2020. <https://features.propublica.org/climate-migration/model-how-climate-refugees-move-across-continents/>.

- Lustgarten, Abraham. 2020b. "Climate Change Will Force a New American Migration." *ProPublica*, September 15, 2020. <https://www.propublica.org/article/climate-change-will-force-a-new-american-migration>.
- Markowitz, Peter L. 2021. "Abolish ICE... and Then What," in *Immigration Matters: Movements, Visions, and Strategies for a Progressive Future*, edited by Ruth Milkman, Deepak Bhargava, and Penny Lewis, 205–220. New York: New Press.
- Martin, Carlos. 2019. "Who Are America's 'Climate Migrants,' and Where Will They Go?" *UrbanWire*, October 22, 2019. <https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/who-are-americas-climate-migrants-and-where-will-they-go>.
- Martinez, Michelle. 2022. "Bridging Belonging: Reclaiming home from the reaches of deterritorialization." (response paper for Roosevelt Institute climate migration colloquium, New York, February 24, 2022).
- Masters, Jeff. 2019. "Fifth Straight Year of Central American Drought Helping Drive Migration." *Scientific American*, December 23, 2019. <https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/eye-of-the-storm/fifth-straight-year-of-central-american-drought-helping-drive-migration>.
- McDougall, AJ. 2021. "Border Patrol Agent on Horseback Filmed Whipping Haitian Asylum Seekers." *Daily Beast*, September 20, 2021. <https://www.thedailybeast.com/us-border-patrol-agent-filmed-whipping-charging-on-horseback-at-haitian-asylum-seekers-on-rio-grande>.
- McGhee, Heather. 2021. *The Sum of Us: What Racism Costs Everyone and How We Can Prosper Together*. London: One World.
- Medina, Eliseo. 2021. "Stronger Together: Immigrant Workers and the Labor Movement," in *Immigration Matters: Movements, Visions, and Strategies for a Progressive Future*, edited by Ruth Milkman, Deepak Bhargava, and Penny Lewis, 72–90. New York: New Press.
- Melaku, Nicole, Stephanie Teatro, and Ahmed Gaya. 2022. "From Scarcity to Abundance: Immigrants Organizing on the Frontlines of Climate Change." (response paper for Roosevelt Institute climate migration colloquium, New York, February 24, 2022).
- Melley, Brian. 2020. "Sierra Club Apologizes for Racist Views of 'Father of National Parks' John Muir." *The Guardian*, July 23, 2020, sec. Environment. <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2020/jul/23/john-muir-sierra-club-apologizes-for-racist-views>.
- Milkman, Ruth. 2020. *Immigrant Labor and the New Precariat*. Medford, MA: Polity Press.
- Miller, Todd, Nathan Akehurst, with Mark Akkerman, and Nick Buxton. 2022. "Border violence and security in a warming world." (response paper for Roosevelt Institute climate migration colloquium, New York, February 24, 2022).

- Miller, Todd, Nick Buxton, and Mark Akkerman. 2021. *Global Climate Wall: How the World's Wealthiest Nations Prioritise Borders Over Climate Action*. Amsterdam: Transnational Institute. <https://www.tni.org/en/publication/global-climate-wall>.
- Miroff, Nick. 2021. "Border Crossings by Haitian Migrants Plunged in October, CBP Data Show." *The Washington Post*, November 11, 2021. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/haiti-border-crossings-deportations/2021/11/11/cb2aa260-4240-11ec-8534-ec852a55e0e6_story.html.
- Mishra, Saarang. 2021. "Rising Far-Right, Declining Centre-Left, and the Future of Refugees in Europe." Observer Research Foundation (ORF), March 16, 2021. ORF. <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/rising-far-right-declining-centre-left-future-refugees-europe/>.
- Munoz, Cecilia. 2021. "The Border and Beyond," in *Immigration Matters: Movements, Visions, and Strategies for a Progressive Future*, edited by Ruth Milkman, Deepak Bhargava, and Penny Lewis, 253–270. New York: New Press.
- Munoz, Cecilia, and John Bridgeland. 2022. "Americans as Welcomers: A response to migration." (response paper for Roosevelt Institute climate migration colloquium, New York, February 24, 2022).
- Ngai, Mae M. 2004. *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ngai, Mae. 2021. "American Nativism, Past and Present," in *Immigration Matters: Movements, Visions, and Strategies for a Progressive Future*, edited by Ruth Milkman, Deepak Bhargava, and Penny Lewis, 39–54. New York: New Press.
- Niedzwiadek, Nick. 2021. "White House: Possible use of whips on Haitian migrants is 'horrific'." *Politico*, September 20, 2021. <https://www.politico.com/news/2021/09/20/psaki-whipping-haitian-migrants-horrific-513106>.
- Oltermann, Philip. 2020. "How Angela Merkel's great migrant gamble paid off." *The Guardian*, August 30, 2020. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/30/angela-merkel-great-migrant-gamble-paid-off>.
- Patel, Kasha, and Niha Masih. 2022. "Climate change has made India's relentless heat 100 times more likely." *The Washington Post*, May 18, 2022. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2022/05/18/heat-climate-change-india-pakistan/>.
- Patterson, Jacqui. 2022. "A Regenerative Economy: The Antidote to the Scarcity Myth Undergirding Xenophobia." (response paper for Roosevelt Institute climate migration colloquium, New York, February 24, 2022).
- Phillips, Steve. 2018. *Brown is the New White: How the Demographic Revolution Has Created a New American Majority*. New York: New Press.

- Piser, Karina. 2019. "The European Left's Dangerous Anti-Immigrant Turn." *The Nation*, June 17, 2019. <https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/denmark-social-democrats-welfare-chauvinism/>.
- Podesta, John. 2019. *The Climate Crisis, Migration, and Refugees*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institute. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-climate-crisis-migration-and-refugees/>.
- Porter, Catherine, Constant Méheut, Matt Apuzzo and Selam Gebrekidan. 2022. "The Root of Haiti's Misery: Reparations to Enslavers." *The New York Times*, May 20, 2022. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/05/20/world/americas/haiti-history-colonized-france.html>.
- Refugees International, 2021. *Task Force Report to the President on the Climate Crisis and Global Migration*. New York: Refugees International. <https://www.refugeesinternational.org/reports/2021/7/12/task-force-report-to-the-president-on-the-climate-crisis-and-global-migration-a-pathway-to-protection-for-people-on-the-move>.
- Rogers, Thomas, 2021. "Welcome to Germany." *New York Review of Books*, April 29, 2021. <https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2021/04/29/welcome-to-germany/>.
- Rubenstein, Madeline. 2012. "Climate Change in Haiti." *State of the Planet* (blog). Columbia Climate School. February 1, 2012. <https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2012/02/01/climate-change-in-haiti>.
- Salas, Angelica. 2021. "From the Ground Up: The Growth of the US Immigrant Rights Movement," in *Immigration Matters: Movements, Visions, and Strategies for a Progressive Future*, edited by Ruth Milkman, Deepak Bhargava, and Penny Lewis, 91–105. New York: New Press.
- Schulthies, Emily. 2021. "Germany's Far-Right AfD Loses Nationally but Wins in the East." *Politico*, September 28, 2021. <https://www.politico.eu/article/german-election-far-right-afd-loses-nationally-but-wins-in-east/>.
- Soanes, Marek, Neha Rai, Paul Steele, Clare Shakya and James Macgregor. 2017. "Delivering Real Change: Getting International Climate Finance to the Local Level." International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) Working Paper. London: IIED. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320258286_Delivering_real_change_Getting_international_climate_finance_to_the_local_level.
- Soni, Saket. 2021. "Immigrants Are Essential: A Manifesto for the Covid-19 and Climate Change Era," in *Immigration Matters: Movements, Visions, and Strategies for a Progressive Future*, edited by Ruth Milkman, Deepak Bhargava, and Penny Lewis, 221–234. New York: New Press.
- Snow, Anita. 2022. "1 in 3 Fears Immigrants Influence US Elections: AP-NORC poll." Associated Press, May 10, 2022. <https://apnews.com/article/immigration-2022-midterm-elections-covid-health-media-2ebbd3849ca35ec76f0f91120639d9d4>.

- Social Security Administration (SSA). 2021. *The 2021 OASDI Trustees Report*. Washington, DC: SSA. <https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/2021/trTOC.html>.
- Southern Poverty Law Center. 2013. *Close to Slavery: Guestworker Programs in the United States*. February 19, 2013. Montgomery, AL: Southern Poverty Law Center. <https://www.splcenter.org/20130218/close-slavery-guestworker-programs-united-states>.
- Stillman, Sarah. 2021. "The Migrant Workers Who Follow Climate Disasters." *The New Yorker*, November 1, 2021. <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/11/08/the-migrant-workers-who-follow-climate-disasters>.
- Streeck, Wolfgang. 2018. "Between Charity and Justice: Remarks on the Social Construction of Immigration Policy in Rich Democracies." *Culture, Practice & Europeanization* 3, no. 2 (August): 3–22. <https://www.uni-flensburg.de/fileadmin/content/seminare/soziologie/dokumente/culture-practice-and-europeanization/vol.3-issue-2-2018/streeck-2018.pdf>.
- Strickland, Kyle, and Felicia Wong. 2021. *A New Paradigm for Justice and Democracy: Moving Beyond the Twin Failures of Neoliberalism and Racial Liberalism*. New York: Roosevelt Institute. https://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/RI_A-New-Paradigm-for-Justice-and-Democracy_Report_202111-1.pdf.
- Sullivan, Eileen. 2022. "U.S. Accelerated Expulsions of Haitian Migrants in May." *The New York Times*, June 9, 2022. <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/09/us/politics/haiti-migrants-biden.html>.
- Taylor, D. 2021. "The Nevada Turnaround: Immigrant Workers Build Political Power," in *Immigration Matters: Movements, Visions, and Strategies for a Progressive Future*, edited by Ruth Milkman, Deepak Bhargava, and Penny Lewis, 121–132. New York: New Press.
- Traub, James. 2021. "Even Sweden Doesn't Want Migrants Anymore." *Foreign Policy*, November 17, 2021. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/17/even-sweden-doesnt-want-migrants-anymore-syria-iraq-belarus/>.
- United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. 2020. *International Migration 2020 Highlights*. New York: United Nations. <https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/news/international-migration-2020>.
- United Nations High Commission for Refugees. 2022. "UNHCR: Ukraine, Other Conflicts Push Forcibly Displaced Total Over 100 Million for First Time." United Nations, May 23, 2022. <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2022/5/628a389e4/unhcr-ukraine-other-conflicts-push-forcibly-displaced-total-100-million.html>.
- US Chamber of Commerce. 2022. "US Chamber: We Can't Fill 11.3 Million Open Jobs Without More Legal Immigration." US Chamber of Commerce, March 19, 2022. <https://www.uschamber.com/workforce/u-s-chamber-we-cant-fill-xx-million-open-jobs-without-more-legal-immigration>.

US Customs and Border Protection. n.d. "Southwest Land Border Encounters." From CBP Public Data Portal. Accessed May 13, 2022. <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/southwest-land-border-encounters>.

US Customs and Border Protection. n.d. USCBP Enforcement Statistics Fiscal Year 2022. From CBP Public Data Portal. Accessed May 23, 2022. <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics>.

Valdes, Javier H., Deborah Axt, Daniel Altschuler, and Angeles Solis. 2021. "Taking on Corporate Complicity in the Trump Era: The 'Corporate Backers of Hate' Campaign," in *Immigration Matters: Movements, Visions, and Strategies for a Progressive Future*, edited by Ruth Milkman, Deepak Bhargava, and Penny Lewis, 133–150. New York: New Press.

Weber, Anna, and Rob Moore. 2019. *Going Under: Long Wait Times for Post-Flood Buyouts Leave Homeowners Underwater*. National Resources Defense Council (NRDC). <https://www.nrdc.org/sites/default/files/going-under-post-flood-buyouts-report.pdf>.

The White House. 2021. *Report on the Impact of Climate Change on Migration*. Washington, DC: The White House. October, 2021. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Report-on-the-Impact-of-Climate-Change-on-Migration.pdf>.

Wilson, Jill. 2019. *Nonimmigrant and Immigrant Visa Categories: Data Brief*. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/homesec/R45938.pdf>.

World Population Review. 2022. "Immigration by Country 2022." Accessed May, 2022. <https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/immigration-by-country>.

Xu, Chi, Timothy A. Kohler, Timothy M. Lenton, Jens-Christian Svenning, and Martin Scheffer. 2020. "Future of Human Climate Niche." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 117, no. 21 (May): 11350–11355. www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1910114117.

Yates, Caitlyn. 2021. "Haitian Migration Through the Americas: A Decade in the Making." *Migration Information Source* (blog). Migration Policy Institute. September 30, 2021. <https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/haitian-migration-through-americas>.



[ROOSEVELTINSTITUTE.ORG](https://www.rooseveltinstitute.org)